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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has original appellate 
jurisdiction pursuant to Article VIII, §5 of the Constitution of 
Utah, and §78-2a-3(f), Utah Code Annotated, (1988, as amended). 
CASE HISTORY 
This is an appeal taken from the final order of denial 
of appellant's Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea to the charge of 
Distribution of a Controlled Substance, a Second Degree Felony, 
and the subsequent judgment and commitment of the appellant to 
the Utah State Prison for not less than 1 nor more than 15 years 
by the Honorable Frank G. Noel, Judge of the Third Judicial 
District Court. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellant was charged by Information dated November 9, 
1988, with two (2) counts of Distribution of a Controlled 
Substance, to wit: Cocaine, in violation of §58-37-8 (1) (a) (ii), 
Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended), both Second Degree 
Felonies, and Habitual Criminal, in violation of §76-8-1001, Utah 
Code Annotated (1953, as amended), a First Degree Felony (R.7-
10). 
The Information alleged that the appellant sold drugs 
to a confidential informant, working with the FBI and State 
Narcotics Officers, on two (2) separate occasions in December, 
1987, and further that the appellant was an habitual criminal 
having been twice convicted and sentenced on qualifying felonies. 
(R.7-10). At the time the appellant was charged with this 
Information, he was in custody in the Salt Lake County Jail 
awaiting trial on federal weapons violation charge. The 
appellant has remained in federal custody at all times pertinent 
to this appeal. (TR 12-18-89 p.6, lines 8-23). On January 6, 
1989, the appellant entered a plea of not guilty to all charges 
in the Information. (R.17; TR 12-18-89 p.7, lines 5-7). On or 
about June 21, 1989, appellant's counsel filed a Notice of Intent 
to rely on the Defense of Entrapment (R.61) and noticed up an 
evidentiary hearing on that issue on August 16, 1989. (R.68). At 
that time, appellant appeared, with his court appointed counsel, 
before the Honorable Frank G. Noel for the taking of evidence on 
the issue of entrapment, as provided for by statute. (R.77-78). 
During the course of the evidentiary hearing, appellant's counsel 
was ordered to withdraw as counsel for the appellant because 
appellee intended to call appellant's defense counsel as a 
witness in the entrapment evidentiary hearing. (R.78, 80-82; TR 
12-18-89 p.7, line 23; p.8, line 7). The Court suspended the 
taking of additional testimony. Once new counsel was appointed 
to represent appellant, the evidentiary hearing on the entrapment 
defense was re-scheduled for October 10, 1989, (R.86) but was 
continued to October 30, 1989; and continued again for hearing on 
October 31, 1989. (TR 10-31-89). Witnesses had been subpoenaed 
for all three (3) scheduled hearings by defendant. (R.88-91). On 
October 31, 1989, appellant appeared before the Honorable Frank 
G. Noel on the final scheduling of the entrapment evidentiary 
hearing. (TR 10-31-89). Instead of proceeding to present 
evidence of his defense, the Court was advised by appellant's 
counsel that appellant wished to enter a plea of guilty to one 
(1) count of Distribution of a Controlled Substance, to wit: 
Cocaine, a 
Second Degree Felony. (TR 10-31-89, p.l). The State 
acknowledged that it would dismiss the second count of 
Distribution of a Controlled Substance and the Habitual Criminal 
charge upon appellant's plea described above. (TR 10-31-89, 
p.l). 
Appellant's counsel had completed a Statement of 
Defendant (see Addendum I, TR 10-31-89 p.l, line 22) for use in 
the taking of the plea, which contained, among other things, a 
summary of appellant's Constitutional rights; a statement of the 
nature and the elements of the offense to which appellant would 
plead; a summary of the facts appellant admitted which supported 
the charge; and a statement of the plea bargain. (R.92-98). The 
appellant acknowledged that he had read the affidavit and his 
attorney had read it to him. (TR 10-31-89 p.l, lines 22-25). 
The appellant acknowledged that he understood his constitutional 
rights including right to jury trial, right to confront the 
witnesses, right to present evidence, right to testify, privilege 
against self-incrimination, and right to appeal. (TR 10-31-89 
p.2, line 3; p.4, line 5). The Judge then instructed appellant 
to sign the Affidavit. (TR 10-31-89 p.3, line 9) After some 
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other discussion the Court advised the appellant of the maximum 
sentence which could be imposed. (TR 10-31-89 p.3, lines 23-25; 
p.4, line 12). Next, the Court reviewed the elements of the 
offense along with the factual basis. (TR 10-31-89 p.4, lines 
13-25; p.5, line 6). After this colliquy, the appellant entered 
his guilty plea. (TR 10-31-89 p.5, lines 10-16). 
After entry of the plea, the Court made some additional 
inquiries regarding appellant's understanding of the plea bargain 
(TR 10-31-89 p.5, line 17; p.6, line 15) and whether defendant 
was under the influence of alcohol or drugs. (TR 10-31-89 p.6, 
lines 10-12). After further clarification of the plea bargain 
the Court then found that the plea was "fully and voluntarily" 
made. (TR 10-31-89 p.7, line 2). The Court then said, "...if 
you intend to ask this court to allow you to withdraw this guilty 
plea, that request must be made within 30 days. Do you 
understand that?" To which the appellant answered, yes. (TR 10-
31-89, p.7, lines 4-12). 
After the Court inquired regarding sentencing, 
appellant's counsel advised the Court that the appellant wanted 
to make a statement to the Court regarding the confidential 
informant's conduct which had induced the appellant to provide 
drugs to the confidential informant. Appellant's counsel advised 
the Court that appellant was drug dependent and that the 
confidential informant working under the supervision of the 
federal and state narcotics enforcement agencies, and knowing of 
appellant's weakness for druges had introduced the appellant and 
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his wife to heroin on numerous occasions over a period of time 
before the appellant supplied drugs to the confidential 
informant. Because the confidential informant had supplied him 
with drugs on many occasions/ appellant then supplied the 
confidential informant with drugs on two (2) occasions out of a 
sense of obligation. (TR 10-31-89 p.8, line 4; p.9, line 9; see 
Addendum III). After this statement by counsel/ the Court did 
not question appellant regarding his allegations of inducement. 
(TR 12-18-89 p.20/ line 4). 
Several hours after appellant pled guilty, appellant 
wrote his counsel/ advising her that he wished to withdraw his 
plea of guilty. (TR 12-18-89 p.20f lines 5-22). Pursuant to 
appellant's request/ on November 17/ 1989/ counsel filed a Motion 
to Set Aside appellant's plea of guilty, (R.101-102) which was 
heard before the Honorable Frank G. Noel on December 18/ 1989. 
(R.105; TR 12-18-87) . 
At that hearing, appellant testified that on the day he 
entered his pleaf he was confused/ depressed/ and downhearted. 
(TR 12-18-89 p.19/ line 10f line 13; p.lOr line 11; p.19/ line 
13). He had been in isolation/ in the "Hole/" in the County Jail 
for two (2) weeks preceding the plea. (TR 10-18-89 p.9/ lines 
10-21). He had been unable to assist his counsel in locating 
witnesses who were difficult to find to subpoena and/ without 
telephone privileges, was not able to persuade these reluctant 
witnesses to testify. (TR 12-18-89 p.9r line 25; p.l4r lines 3-
11; p.15, lines 2-4). He was unable to contact his attorney to 
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thoroughly discuss his concerns. (TR 12-18-89 p.15, lines 5-13). 
For these reasons, appellant argued that his plea was not 
voluntary. 
Further, appellant testified that although his counsel 
had advised him otherwise, he believed he had an entrapment 
defense. (TR 12-18-89 p.10, lines 18-22). He said that the 
confidential informant "used my wife, possibly and myself. And 
he used drugs to get to us and do things that we were trying to 
stay away from doing." Three (3) to four (4) weeks before 
appellant sold drugs to the confidential informant, the 
confidential informant had given appellant and his wife heroin 
and/or cocaine four (4) to five (5) times per week. Appellant 
testified that he believed that the confidential informant's 
activities were "illegal" and "wrong." (TR 12-18-89 p.29, lines 
21-24). 
After the taking of appellant's testimony, and hearing 
the argument of counsel on the other issues based on the motion, 
the Court denied appellant's motion to withdraw his plea and 
rescheduled sentencing for January 5, 1990. (R.112) On January 
5, 1990, Judge Noel sentenced the appellant to the Utah State 
Prison for an indeterminate term of not less than one (1) nor 
more than fifteen (15) years to run concurrently with the 
appellant's federal sentence. (R.113). On January 12, 1990, the 
Judgment and Commitment issued from the Third District Court. 
(R.113). Appellant filed his Notice of Appeal and Designation of 
Record on January 16, 1990. (R.114-115). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Appellant's plea of guilty to the crime of 
Distribution of a Controlled Substance was not knowingly, 
intelligently, or voluntarily given. The lower Court failed to 
make appropriate findings as required by §77-35-11 (e), Utah Code 
Annotated (1989, as amended), and improperly used the pre-
Gibbons standard review. The lower Court failed to make an 
adequate, factual inquiry into the voluntariness of appellant's 
plea in light of his mental and emotional condition. The lower 
Court failed to advise the appellant of his right to cross-
examine the witnesses against him as required by §77-35-11(e) (3), 
Utah Code Annotated, (1989, as amended). The lower Court failed 
to establish on the record that the appellant understood the 
nature and elements of the crime to which he pled in relation to 
his claimed defense of entrapment. The lower Court failed to 
adequately advise the appellant that he may not be permitted to 
withdraw his plea at a later date, even though his motion were 
timely filed. Therefore, the lower Court, in light of these 
errors in the taking of the plea, abused its discretion in 
denying appellant's motion to withdraw his previously entered 
plea of guilty. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
JUDGE NOEL ABUSED HIS DISCRETION IN 
DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE 
HIS PLEA OF GUILTY TO DISTRIBUTION OF 
A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE 
Absent a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of 
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constitutional and statutory rights and strict compliance with 
Rule 11(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, appellant's 
plea must be set aside. 
It is well established that a knowing, intelligent and 
voluntary plea of guilty that admits each element of the offense 
has the same effect and weight as if the defendant had been found 
guilty at trial by a jury of his peers. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 
U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 231 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969), State v. 
Gallegos, 738 P.2d 1040 (Utah, 1987). Since the entry of a 
guilty plea is accomplished without a review of all the evidence 
as would be had in trial and because it involves a waiver of 
substantial constitutional rights, the Court has been granted 
statutory authority to review the facts surrounding the entry of 
a guilty plea and, if appropriate, can, upon a showing of good 
cause, permit defendant to withdraw his previously entered guilty 
plea. 
§77-13-6, Utah Code Annotated (1953, as 
amended) providess 
A plea of not guilty may be withdrawn prior to 
conviction. A plea of guilty or no contest 
may be withdrawn only upon good cause shown 
and with leave of the Court. (Emphasis 
added.) 
Withdrawal of a plea of guilty is a privilege and not a 
right. 
State v. Hansen, 627 P.2d 53, 54 (Utah, 1981). The granting of a 
motion to withdraw is within the sound discretion of the trial 
court. State v. Bennett, 657 P.2d 1353 (Utah, 1983). If the 
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record does not demonstrate that a plea of guilty was knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntarily made, and the Court refuses to set 
the plea aside, then it has been held that the Court has abused 
its discretion. State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 1312 (Utah 
App., 1987), State v. Valencia, 776 P.2d 1332 (Utah App., 1989). 
Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, and 
§75-35-11(3), Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended), sets forth 
legislative criteria designed to insure that guilty pleas have 
been knowingly and intelligently entered. It provides: 
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea 
of guilty or no contest and shall not accept 
such a plea until the court has made the 
findings: 
(1) That if the defendant is not 
represented by counsel he has knowingly waived 
his right to counsel and does not desire 
counsel; 
(2) That the plea is voluntarily made; 
(3) That the defendant knows he has 
rights against compulsory self-incrimination, 
to a jury trial and to confront and cross-
examine in open court the witnesses against 
him, and that by entering the plea he waives 
all of those rights; 
(4) That the defendant understands the 
nature and elements of the offense to which he 
is entering the plea; that upon trial the 
prosecution would have the burden of proving 
each of those elements beyond a reasonable 
doubt; and that the plea is an admission of 
all those elements; 
(5) That the defendant knows the minimum 
and maximum sentence that may be imposed upon 
him for each offense to which a plea is 
entered, including the possibility of the 
imposition of consecutive sentences; and, 
(6) Whether the tendered plea is a result 
of a prior plea discussion and plea agreement 
and if so, what agreement had been reached. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Though our Rule 11 is patterned after the provisions of 
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Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the specific 
requirements are slightly different. Our Rule requires the Court 
to make the aforesaid findings without specifying the manner in 
which the Judge must establish the factual basis for his 
findings; whereas under the Federal Rule, the trial court is 
statutorily required to "address the defendant personally" to 
determine if the defendant's plea is knowing and voluntary and to 
determine if there is a factual basis for the plea which would 
show an adequate relationship between defendant's admitted acts 
and the requirements of the law. Despite this procedural 
difference, the rules are similar in that they both require the 
Court accepting the plea to make factual findings that the 
defendant is knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waiving 
his constitutional rights and is indeed guilty of the crime to 
which he is pleading. 
Failure to strictly adhere to the federal procedure can 
result in reversal as in McCarthy v. U.S., 394 U.S. 459, 22 
L.Ed.2d 418, 89 S.Ct. 1166 (1969). There the Court reversed the 
conviction of a defendant based upon his plea of guilty because 
the trial judge had failed to strictly comply with the 
requirements of the federal Rule designed to insure that the plea 
was knowing and voluntary. The Court further ordered that all 
factors used in assessing the voluntariness of the plea must be 
made a matter of record to aid an Appellate Court in its review. 
Since the record was silent on the waiver of the defendant's 
constitutional rights, defendant was permitted to withdraw his 
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plea of guilty. 
Later in Boykin v. Alabama, supra, the Supreme Court 
used similar reasoning as in McCarthy, supra, to hold that it was 
plain reversible error for a state trial judge to accept a guilty 
plea without "an affirmative showing that it was intelligent and 
voluntary" at 242. The Court, at 243, firmly stated: 
What is at stake for an accused facing death 
or imprisonment demands the utmost solicitude 
of which Courts are capable in canvassing the 
matter with the accused to make sure that he 
has a full understanding of what the plea 
connotes and of its consequence. When the 
Judge discharges that function, he leaves a 
record adequate for any review that may be 
later sought... (Citation omitted). 
Before a guilty plea can be accepted, the trial court 
must first afford the defendant all rights founded on McCarthy 
and Boykin, supra, as well as our Rule 11, and determine, as a 
matter of fact, based upon the record, that the defendant 
received "meaningful notice of the true nature of the charges 
against him, the first and most universally recognized 
requirement of due process." Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 
645, 96 S.Ct. 2253, 2257, 49 L.Ed.2d 198 (1976). The defendant 
must further "understand the elements of the crimes charged and 
the relationship of the law to the facts." State v. Gibbons, 
supra at 1312, citing with approval McCarthy, supra. "There is 
no adequate substitute for demonstrating on the record at the 
time the plea is entered the defendant's understanding of the 
nature of the charge against him." McCarthy, at 470, 89 S.Ct. at 
1172. (Emphasis added). The trial judge cannot rely upon 
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defense counsel's assertion that the defendant fully understands 
the nature of the charge and the elements of the offense. 
McCarthy, supra. See also, State v. Gibbons, supra. 
To assist in the process of accepting guilty pleas, 
some Utah courts have designed a pre-printed form to advise a 
defendant of his constitutional rights, to explain the nature and 
the elements of the offense, andto detail the complete plea 
bargain. Such a pre-printed form was used in the instant case. 
(See Addendum I.) 
A trial judge is permitted to use a pre-printed 
affidavit as a "starting point, not an end point, in the pleading 
process." Gibbons at 1313. However, 
...A sufficient affidavit is one which is 
signed by the defendant, his attorney, the 
rosecutor, and the trial judge and which lists 
the names and the degrees of the crimes 
charged. The affidavit should contain both a 
statement of the elements of the offenses and 
a synopsis of the defendant's acts that 
establish the elements of the crimes charged. 
The affidavit should clearly state the 
allowable punishment of the crimes charged and 
should note that multiple punishments for 
multiple crimes may be imposed consecutively. 
The affidavit should list individually and 
specifically the rights waived by the entry of 
the guilty plea. The details of any plea 
bargain would be set forth in the affidavit as 
well as a disclaimer concerning any sentencing 
recommendations as required by Rule 11(e). 
Finally, the affidavit should disclose the 
defendant's ability to read and understand the 
English language, the absence of promises to 
induce the plea, and the defendant's 
competency. The trial judge should then 
review the statements in the affidavit with 
the defendant, question the defendant 
concerning his understanding of it, and 
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fulfill the other requirements imposed by §77-
35-11 on the record before accepting the 
guilty plea, (Emphasis added.) Gibbons at p. 
1313. 
Before the procedure was mandated by Gibbons, technical 
non-compliance with Rule 11 had been excused in Warner v. Morris, 
709 P.2d 309 (Utah 1985) and Brooks v. Morris, 709 P.2d 310 
(Utah, 1985). In these cases the Supreme Court held that so long 
as the "record as a whole" established that the defendant 
knowingly and voluntarily entered his plea, the guilty plea would 
stand. 
With Gibbons, the "record as a whole" test was replaced 
with "strict compliance." Technical non-compliance with Rule 11 
invalidates the plea. State v. Vasilacopulos, supra. 
Close examination of the record in the instant case 
reveals that: A) the court failed to make the appropriate 
finding required by Rule 11(e) of Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure; B) the lower court failed to make an adequate, factual 
inquiry into the voluntariness of appellant's plea in light of 
his mental and emotional condition; C) the lower court failed to 
inform the appellant that he had the right to cross-examine, in 
open court, the witnesses against him; D) the lower court failed 
to make a factual inquiry into the appellant's understanding of 
the nature and the elements of the offense in 
light of appellant's affirmative defense of entrapment; and, E) 
the lower court failed to advise the appellant that a motion to 
withdraw guilty plea was in the discretion of the court, leaving 
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the appellant with a false impression that he would be permitted 
to set aside his plea upon the filing of an appropriate motion. 
POINT TWO 
THE COURT FAILED TO MAKE FINDINGS AS REQUIRED BY 
RULE 11(e) OF THE UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
IN ADVANCE OF ACCEPTING APPELLANT'S PLEA OF GUILTY 
Rule 11(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, 
cited above, requires the lower court to make specific findings, 
among others, that a guilty plea is voluntarily made; that the 
defendant knows and understands his constitutional rights, and 
that he waives those rights by entering a plea of guilty; that 
the defendant understands the nature and element of the offense 
and that by pleading guilty, the defendant admits the commission 
of the offense. 
Rule 11(e) squarely places on trial Courts the 
burden of ensuring that Constitutional and 
Rule 11(e) requirements are complied with when 
a guilty plea is entered. Gibbons at 1312. 
The only finding made by the lower Court after 
accepting appellant's plea was that the plea was "fully and 
voluntarily" made. 
"Strict and not just substantial compliance with the 
rule is required." State v. Valencia, supra at 1334. State v. 
Vasilocopulos, supra. Because the trial court failed in its duty 
to make the appropriate findings at the time the plea was 
entered, appellant's plea was not properly entered and must be 
set aside. 
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POINT THREE 
THE COURT FAILED TO MAKE AN ADEQUATE FACTUAL 
INQUIRY INTO THE VOLUNTARINESS OF APPELLANT'S 
PLEA IN LIGHT OF HIS MENTAL AND EMOTIONAL 
CONDITION 
At the time the lower court took appellant's pleaf the 
court failed to ask the appellant whether he was suffering from 
any mental disease or defect which would impair his ability to 
enter a knowing and voluntary guilty plea. The court did inquire 
of appellant whether he was under the influence of drugs or 
alcohol (Tr. 10-31-89 p.6, lines 10 - 12), and whether he was 
entering his plea voluntarily without force or promises (Tr. 10-
31-89 p.5, lines 17 - 21). 
Two weeks before the hearing before Judge Noel, the 
appellant was placed in an isolation cell in the Salt Lake County 
jail. While in isolation appellant was unable to assist in his 
own defense, was unable to assist counsel in locating defense 
witnesses, was unable to telephone reluctant witnesses to 
persuade them to come forward and was unable to communicate with 
his counsel. Appellant testified that at the time he entered his 
plea he was confused, downhearted, and depressed. Therefore, his 
plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered. 
POINT FOUR 
THE COURT FAILED TO ADVISE THE APPELLANT THAT 
HE HAD THE RIGHT TO CROSS-EXAMINE, IN OPEN COURT, 
THE WITNESSES AGAINST HIM. 
Although the lower Court reviewed with appellant many 
of the constitutional rights required by Rule 11(e)(3), it failed 
to advise the appellant that he had a right to cross-examine the 
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witnesses against him in open court. 
The right of cross-examination is a valuable and 
fundamental right guaranteed by Article I, §12 of the Utah 
Constitution and the Sixth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution. The right is generally considered to derive from 
an accused's right to confront the witnesses against him, but it 
also gives the right of confrontation real meaning in that: 
Cross-examination is the principal means by 
which the believability of a witness and the 
truth of his testimony is tested... We have 
recognized that the exposure to a witness' 
motivation in testifying is a proper and 
important function of the constitutionally 
protected right of cross-examination. Davis 
v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 39 
L.Ed.2d 347 (1974) 
The right of cross-examination is especially important 
in cases which involve "informers or others who hope for police 
leniency." State v. Maestes, 564 P.2d 1386, 1388, citing with 
approval, Evans v. Alaska, 550 P.2d 830 (Alaska, 1976). In the 
instant case, the critical witness against appellant was such an 
informer described in Evans v. Alaska (TR 12-18-89 p.12, lines 1-
7). The failure to advise appellant of his right to cross-
examine the witnesses against him not only violated Rule 11, but 
also rendered appellant's plea involuntary. 
POINT FIVE 
THE COURT FAILED TO MAKE A FACTUAL INQUIRY OF 
THE APPELLANT'S UNDERSTANDING OF THE NATURE AND THE 
ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSE IN LIGHT OF THE APPELLANT'S 
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE OF ENTRAPMENT 
§76-2-303(1) Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended) 
provides: 
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It is a defense that the actor was entrapped 
into committing the offense. Entrapment 
occurs when a law enforcement officer or a 
person directed by or acting in cooperation 
with the officer induces the commission of an 
offense in order to obtain evidence of the 
commission for prosecution by methods creating 
a substantial risk that the offense would be 
committed by one not otherwise ready to commit 
it. Conduct merely affording a person an 
opportunity to commit an offense does not 
constitute entrapment 
With this defense, a defendant may deny criminal liability while 
admitting to the commission of the offense itself. Such was the 
instant case. Appellant did not deny that he had intentionally 
sold drugs to the confidential informant. Appellant claimed, 
however, that he was entrapped into committing the offense. The 
confidential informant had given the appellant and his wife 
heroin and/or cocaine four (4) to five (5) times per week in the 
three (3) to four (4) weeks preceding. Appellant alleged that 
this improper conduct induced the commission of the crimes to 
which appellant stood charged. (TR 12-18-89 p.11, line 23; p.14, 
line 11); p.29, line 21; p.30, line 4). 
At the time the Court accepted the appellant's plea of 
guilty to the crime of distribution of a controlled substance, it 
was aware that the appellant had raised the affirmative defense 
of entrapment. In fact, the Court had already taken some limited 
testimony on the defense and had continued the remaining 
testimony three (3) times. When the case was called, the Judge 
said, "The matter before the Court this morning is State of Utah 
v. Douglas Reed Jones, C [sic] 88-1656. This matter is set this 
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morning for a hearing on an entrapment motion." (TR 10/31/89 
p.l, lines 1-5) "...Do I understand correctly that a resolution 
in this matter has been reached?" (TR 10/31/89, p.l, lines 12-
13). The Court then proceeded with the taking of the plea during 
which the following colloquy took place (TR 10/31/89, p.4, line 
13 through p. 5, line 6): 
THE COURT: THE ELEMENTS OF THIS OFFENSE WITH 
WHICH YOU'VE BEEN CHARGED ARE THAT YOU 
INTENTIONALLY DISTRIBUTED A CONTROLLED 
SUBSTANCE, TO WIT, COCAINE. IN ORDER FOR YOU 
TO BE CONVICTED OF THIS OFFENSE, THE STATE 
WOULD BE REQUIRED TO PROVE EACH AND EVERYONE 
OF THOSE ELEMENTS BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT. 
DO YOU UNDERSTAND THAT? 
THE DEFENDANT: YES. 
THE COURT: HOWEVER, IF YOU PLEAD GUILTY 
TODAY THE STATE WILL NOT BE REQUIRED TO MAKE 
THAT PROOF, YOU'LL BE CONVICTED OF THAT CHARGE 
BY YOUR OWN ADMISSION; DO YOU UNDERSTAND THAT? 
THE DEFENDANT: YES. 
THE COURT: THEY ALLEGE AS FACTS TO SUPPORT 
THIS CHARGE ON DECEMBER 11, 1987, YOU SOLD ONE 
QUARTER OUNCE OF COCAINE TO AN UNDERCOVER 
NARCOTICS AGENT FOR $425.00, IN SALT LAKE 
CITY, UTAH. DO YOU UNDERSTAND THAT IF YOU 
PLEAD GUILTY, YOU'LL BE ADMITTING THOSE FACTS? 
THE DEFENDANT: YES, SIR. 
No inquiry was made by the Court regarding the entrapment defense 
prior to acceptance of the guilty plea. Later, when the Court 
raised the issue of a pre-sentence report, appellant's counsel 
advised the Court (TR 10/31/89, p.8, line 4 through p.9, line 9): 
MS. MOWER: ...WE WOULD LIKE TO HAVE INCLUDED 
FOR THE COURT'S CONSIDERATION, THOUGH, A 
STATEMENT BY MR JONES. AND THE THRUST OF THE 
STATEMENT WOULD BE THIS: MR. JONES DOES NOT 
DENY THAT THERE WAS A TRANSFER OF A CONTROLLED 
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SUBSTANCE. BUT HIS CONCERN FROM THE VERY 
BEGINNING OF THE CASE WAS THE CONDUCT OF THE 
INFORMANT IN THIS CASE. 
MR. JONES WOULD NOT HAVE YOU BELIEVE 
THAT HE IS AS HE SAYS, AN ANGLE (sic). HE 
CERTAINLY HAD A PROBLEM WITH DRUGS BEFORE HE 
EVER MET MR. FERNANDEZ, BEFORE HE DID ANYTHING 
WITH MR. FERNANDEZ. BUT HE FEELS AS THOUGH 
MR. FERNANDEZ PREYED ON HIS DRUG VULNERABILITY 
AND DID THAT BY WAY OF COMING TO MR. JONES'S 
HOUSE PRIOR TO THE TIME OF TRANSACTIONS, 
INTRODUCING MR. JONES TO REGULARS OF HEROIN, 
AND THEN GOT MR. JONES TO SELL HIM SOME 
COCAINE OUT OF AN OBLIGATION BECAUSE THE 
UNDERCOVER INFORMANT HAD PROVIDED HIM WITH 
DRUGS. 
MR. JONES HAS BEEN VERY CONCERNED 
ABOUT THAT, AND THAT'S THE ISSUE THAT HE ASKED 
ME TO RAISE IN TERMS OF THE ENTRAPMENT 
DEFENSE. HE BELIEVED THAT HE WAS PARTICULARLY 
VULNERABLE, AND HE DIDN'T BELIEVE THAT'S 
SOMETHING THAT UNDERCOVER AGENTS OUGHT TO BE 
DOING, TAKING ADVANTAGE OF VULNERABILITIES OF 
DRUG ADDICTS. 
HE'S WILLING TO ACKNOWLEDGE IN TERMS 
OF A DEFENSE, WE WOULD PROBABLY — WE WOULD 
NOT BE SUCCESSFUL, BUT HE WANTS THE COURT TO 
UNDERSTAND PART OF THE MOTIVATION BEHIND THIS 
WAS THE FACT THAT MR. FERNANDEZ HAD BEEN 
COMING TO HIS HOUSE GIVING HIM DRUGS, SHOT HIM 
UP, AND HIS WIFE AS WELL. 
THE DEFENDANT: WHILE I WAS AT WORK. 
MS. MOWER: HIS CONCERN IS THAT 
PROBABLY SHOULDN'T BE HAPPENING IN THESE KINDS 
OF CASES. 
Even after this exchange, the Court made no effort to question 
the appellant about counsel's allegations of alleged inducement. 
In State v. Breckenridge, 688 P.2d 440 (Utah, 1983), 
the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
Concerns for the legitimacy or truth of a 
guilty plea is an integral part of 
ascertaining the voluntariness of that plea. 
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Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 11(e)(2) 
requires the court to find that a guilty plea 
is voluntarily made before it accepts it. A 
guilty plea cannot be voluntary if it is 
uninformed. Breckenridge at 443, 
To determine whether or not a defendant is property informed, the 
Utah Supreme Court has provided the following guidance: 
We think the most effective way to do this is 
to have a defendant state in his own words his 
understanding of the offense and the actions 
which make him guilty of the offense. By this 
statement, the trial court can assure itself 
that the defendant is truly submitting a 
voluntary and knowing plea. Moreover, the 
record on appeal will clearly reflect the 
defendant's understanding. State v. Copeland, 
765 P.2d 1266, at 1273 (Utah, 1988) 
What appears to be mere dicta in Copeland was 
transformed to law in State v. Valencia, 776 P.2d 1332 (Utah App. 
1989). In that case, the defendant claimed that he did not enter 
a knowing and voluntary guilty plea to a drug charge even though 
the court used a pre-printed affidavit which presumably contained 
some of the information required by Rule 11(e) of the Utah Rules 
of Criminal Procedure. Instead, the Court of Appeals found: 
The brief, conclusory inquiry posed by the 
trial judge is by itself inadequate to assure 
the Court that defendant's plea was entered 
with the informed knowledge and understanding 
required by Rule 11 (s) (sic). When an 
affidavit is used to evidence defendant's 
knowledge and willingness to plead guilty, the 
trial court's examination of defendant 
regarding the affidavit's contents should be 
sufficiently detailed and extensive to provide 
a factual basis to conclude from defendant's 
responses that his decision was knowing and 
voluntary. This understanding of the elements 
of the charges and the relationship of the law 
and the facts may not be presumed from a 
silent, or incomplete, examination. Valencia 
at 1335 (Emphasis added.) 
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Because the lower Court never did inquire of 
appellant's understanding of the law and the facts in relation to 
his defense of entrapment, the Court could not properly conclude 
that appellant's plea was voluntary. 
POINT SIX 
THE LOWER COURT FAILED TO ADVISE THE APPELLANT THAT A 
MOTION TO WITHDRAW GUILTY PLEA WAS IN THE DISCRETION 
OF THE COURT LEAVING APPELLANT WITH A FALSE IMPRESSION 
THAT HE WOULD BE PERMITTED TO SET ASIDE HIS PLEA UPON 
THE FILING OF AN APPROPRIATE MOTION 
During the hearing on appellant's Motion to Set Aside 
Guilty Plea, appellant testified that he believed, on the basis 
of his counsel's statements and those of the Court, that he could 
elect to withdraw his plea of guilty if he so chose. Appellant 
testified that when he was reviewing the Change of Plea Statement 
with counsel, prior to his plea, his counsel advised him that he 
could withdraw his plea within thirty (30) days. (TR 12/18/89, 
p.10, lines 18-24; p.17, line 9-11; p.21, line 14-15.) This 
belief that the plea could be withdrawn was confirmed during the 
taking of appellant's plea when the following took place in 
appellant's presence: 
MS. MOWER: LET ME REMIND THE COURT WE MUST 
ADVISE MR. JONES ABOUT HIS RIGHT TO WITHDRAW 
HIS GUILTY PLEA. IT IS GOOD FOR ONLY 30 DAYS. 
THE COURT: CERTAINLY, I INTEND TO DO THAT. 
(TR 10/31/89, p.3, line 10-13.) 
Later, after the Court had accepted the appellant's plea of 
guilty, the Court said: 
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THE COURT: AND I WILL ADVISE YOU MR. JONES 
THAT IF YOU INTEND TO ASK THIS COURT TO ALLOW 
YOU TO WITHDRAW THIS GUILTY PLEA THAT REQUEST 
MUST BE MADE WITHIN 3 0 DAYS; DO YOU UNDERSTAND 
THAT? 
THE DEFENDANT: YES. 
(TR 10/31/89, p.7, line 4-8.) 
These three (3) references to "30 days" to withdraw a 
guilty plea result from counsel's and the Court's misguided 
attempt to satisfy the additional language added to §77-13-6, 
Utah Code Annotated/ in 1989, as follows: 
(2) (b) A request to withdraw a plea of guilty 
or no contest is made by motion, and shall be 
made within 30 days after the entry of the 
plea. 
and Rule 11(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides 
that the court must make a finding that: 
(7) the defendant has been advised of the 
time limits for filing any motion to withdraw 
a plea of guilty or not contest. 
At no time did counsel or the Court advise the 
appellant of the requirements of §77-13-6 (2) (a) which provides: 
"A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only upon good 
cause shown and with leave of the court." 
Nor did the Court correct counsel's apparent 
misstatement regarding the appellant's "right to withdraw his 
plea." This failure to correct and clarify the correct standard 
prescribed by law misinformed the appellant and understandingly 
gave rise to his confusion. 
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CONCLUSION 
Under the strict compliance requirement of Gibbons, 
appellant's plea must be set aside. Technical non-compliance 
with Rule 11 has rendered appellant's guilty plea involuntary. 
Appellant therefore seeks an Order of this court vacating his 
guilty plea and remanding the matter to the Third Judicial 
District Court for trial. « 
Respectfully submitted this ^-^^^ay of June, 1990. 
" tON & HOLLAND 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that four (4) true and accurate copies 
of the foregoing Brief of Appellant was mailed, postage prepaid, 
to Dan Larsen, Assistant Attorney General, Attorney for 
Plaintiff/AppelolQ^Jfrfom 236, State C^pjL^ofj, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84114, this 7$J^day of June^ 
olQiO-nJty°m 23< 
:  s ffl)J^-day 
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ADDENDUM # 1 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE Tjiith 
STATE OF UTAH 
JUD^I^Lv;D,JSTRlG^ 
OCT 3 1 1989 
fia.wT w*iftt CCv • "< 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/ 
v. 
Defendant• 
ey LrtV-*; v< «tfK 
STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT 
Criminal No, 
COMES NOW, T)0|y^4<> fjFFJ) ^XJfcS the defendant in this 
case and hereby acknowledges and certifies the following: 
I have entered a plea off (guiltyr 
following crimec^: 
CRIME 
rao congest t) to the 
DEGREE PUNISHMENT (Min/Max) 
B.. 
C. 
D. 
I have received a copy of the (cVadae^ •information) 
against me, I have read it, and I understand the nature 
elements of the offenseOsV for which I am pleading^ (guiltyj) &o 
corrcest). 
The elements of the crimeCw of which I am charged are as 
f o l l o w s : ()) Ite&KTWTVfrl 
P ) ~£/SnQfti/77<J70> 
3) c^-k d6KfrUu^f\ Stus&r^KsOZ 
</) CdOlMt^ 
My conduct/ and the conduct of other persons for which I 
am criminally liable, that constitutes the elements of the 
c r i m e ^ charged are as follows: 
1 ^ 
bttesK plea()£ I am entering this/thft^ SBv ()(X voluntarily and with 
knowledge and understanding of the following facts: 
1. I know that I have the right to be represented by an 
attorney and that if I cannot afford one, an attorney will be 
appointed by the court at no cost to me. 
2. IM[have notJ> (pa^^) waived my right to counsel. If I 
have waived my right to counsel, I have done so knowingly, 
intelligently and voluntarily because of the following 
reasons: 
3. If I have waived my right to counsel, I have read 
this statement and understand the nature and elements of the 
charges, my rights in this and other proceedings and the 
consequences of my plea of guilty. 
4. If I have not waived my right to counsel/ my attorney 
_, and I have had an opportunity to 
discuss this statement/ my rights and the consequences of my 
guilty plea with my attorney. 
5. I know that I have a right to a trial by jury, 
6. I know that if I wish to have a trial I have the 
right to confront and cross-examine witnesses against me or to 
have them cross-examined by my attorney. I also know that I 
have the right to have my witnesses subpoenaed at state expense 
to testify in court upon my behalf. 
7. I know that I have a right to testify in my own 
behalf but if I choose not to do so I can not be compelled to 
testify or give evidence against myself and no adverse 
inferences will be drawn against me if I do not testify. 
8. I know that if I wish to contest the charge against 
me I need only plead "not guilty" and the matter will be set 
for trial/ at which time the State of Utah will have the burden 
of proving each element of the charge beyond a reasonable 
doubt. If the trial is before a jury the verdict must be 
unanimous• 
9. I know that under the Constitution of Utah that if I 
were tried and convicted by a jury or by the judge that I would 
have the right to appeal ray conviction and sentence to the Utah 
Court of Appeals or# where allowed/ to the Supreme Court of 
Utah and that if I could not afford to pay the costs for such 
appeal, those costs would be paid by the state. 
10. I know that the maximum possible sentence may be 
imposed upon my plea of guilty, and that sentence may be for a 
- 3 -
prison term, fine, or both. I know that in addition to any 
fine, a ^ £ 2 _ % surcharge, required by Utah Code Annotated 
63-63-9, will be imposed. I also know that I may be ordered by 
the court to make restitution to any victim or victims of my 
crimes. 
11. I know that imprisonment may be for consecutive 
periods, or the fine for additional amounts, if my plea is to 
more than one charge. I also know that if I am on probation, 
parole or awaiting sentencing on another offense of which I 
have been convicted or to which I have pleaded guilty, my plea 
in the present action may result in consecutive sentences being 
imposed upon me. 
.12. I know and understand that by pleading /fguiltx)) J$o 
coni^st) I am waiving my statutory and constitutional rights 
set out in the preceding paragraphs. I also know that by 
entering such plea^X) I am admitting and do so admit that I 
have committed the conduct, alleged and I am guilty of the 
crimeyk) for which my pleaQy LsZ^ jfe entered. 
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result of a plea bargain^T&S^ween myself and the prosecuting 
. My plea(& of /guilty))^patfdoWest) ^ ) i j / n ^ the 
attorney. The promises, duties and provisions of this plea 
bargain, if any, are fully contained in the Plea Agreement 
attached to this affidavit. 
14. I know that any charge or sentencing concession or 
recommendation of probation or suspended sentence, including a 
reduction of the charges for sentencing made or sought by 
either defense counsel or the prosecuting attorney are not 
binding on the judge. I also know that any opinions they 
- 4 -
express to me as to what they believe the court may do are also 
not binding on the court. 
15. No threats/ coercion/ or unlawful influence of any 
kind have been made to induce me to plead guilty, and no 
promises except/ those contained herein and in the attached 
plea agreement/ have been made to me. 
16. I have read this statement or I have had it read to 
me by my attorney/ and I understand its provisions. I know 
that I am free to change or delete anything contained in this 
affidavit. I do not wish to make any changes because all of 
the statements are correct. 
17. I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my 
attorney. 
18. I am y \ years of age; I have attended school 
through the ade and I can read and understand the 
English language. I was not under the influence of any drugs/ 
medication or intoxicants when the decision to enter the 
plea(V> was made. I am not presently under the influence of 
any drugs, medication or intoxicants. 
19. I believe myself to be of a sound and discerning 
mind/ mentally capable of understanding the proceedings and the 
consequences of my plea and free of any mental disease/ defect 
or impairment that would prevent me from knowingly/ 
intelligently and voli\ntarily entering my plea< 
DATED this £ 
I un : 
t^*^ dav of 
• rgrvwv, 
efendant/ 
- 5 -
CERTIFICATE OF ATTORNEY 
I certify that I am the attorney for 
the defendant above, and that I know he/sWe has read the 
statement or that I have read it to him/het and I have 
discussed it with him/hVr and believe that he/slW fully 
understands the meaning of its contents and is mentally and 
physically competent. To the best of my knowledge and belief 
after an appropriate investigation, the elements of the 
crimeCsi) and the factual synopsis of the defendant's criminal 
conduct are correctly stated and these, along with the other 
representations and declarations made lay the defendant in the 
foregoing affidavit, are accurateT"knd Jcriie. 
:ne] 
CERTIFICATE OF PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in 
the case against , defendant. I have 
reviewed this statement of the defendant and find that the 
declarations, including the elements of the offense of the 
charge(s) and the factual synopsis of the defendant's criminal 
conduct which constitutes the offense are true and correct. No 
improper inducements, threats or coercion to encourage a plea 
have been offered defendant. The plea negotiations are fully 
contained in the statement and in the attached plea agreement 
or as supplemented on record before the court. There is 
reasonable cause to believe that the evidence would support the 
conviction of defendant for the offense(s) for which the 
- 6 -
plea(s) is/are entered and acceptance of the plea(s) would 
serve the public interest. 
"Prosecuting/Ajbtorne^ 
ORDER 
Based upon the facts set forth in the foregoing statement 
and certification/ the court finds the defendants plea of 
guilty is freely and voluntarily made and £t is so ordered that 
the defendants plea oi (i^cchrcest) to the chargeCsQ 
set forth in the statement be accepted and entered. 
3\ day of £)^X , 192 / DONE IN COURT this 
s~\ 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
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ADDENDUM #2 
77-35-11. Rule 11 — Pleas [Repealed effec-
tive July 1, 1990). 
(1) Upon arraignment, except for an infraction, a 
defendant shall be represented by counsel, unless the 
defendant waives counsel in open court. The defen-
dant may not be required to plead until he has had a 
reasonable time to confer with counsel. 
(2) A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, no 
contest, not guilty by reason of insanity, or guilty and 
mentally ill. A defendant may plead in the alterna-
tive not guilty or not guilty by reason of insanity. If a 
defendant refuses to plead or if a defendant corpora-
tion fails to appear, the court shall enter a plea of not 
guilty. 
(3) A defendant may plead no contest only with the 
consent of the court. 
(4) When a defendant enters a plea of not guilty, 
the case shall forthwith be set for trial. A defendant 
unable to make bail shall be given a preference for an 
early trial. In cases other than felonies the court shall 
advise the defendant, or his counsel, of the require-
ments for making a written demand for a jury trial. 
(5) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty 
or no contest, and may not accept the plea until the 
court has found: 
(a) if the defendant is not represented by coun-
sel, he has knowingly waived his right to counsel 
and does not desire counsel; 
(b) the plea is voluntarily made; 
(c) the defendant knows he has rights against 
compulsory self-incrimination, to a jury trial, 
and to confront and cross-examine in open court 
the witnesses against him, and that by entering 
the plea he waives all of those rights; 
(d) the defendant understands the nature and 
elements of the ofTense to which he is entering 
the plea; that upon trial the prosecution would 
have the burden of proving each of those ele-
ments beyond a reasonable doubt; and that the 
plea is an admission of all those elements; 
(e) the defendant knows the minimum and 
maximum sentence that may be imposed upon 
him for each offense to which a plea is entered, 
including the possibility of the imposition of con-
secutive sentences; 
(0 if the tendered plea is a result of a Jbrior 
plea discussion and plea agreement, and if so, 
what agreement has been reached; and 
(g) the defendant has been advised of the time 
limits for filing any motion to withdraw a plea of 
guilty or no contest. 
(6) Failure to advise the defendant of the time 
limits for filing any motion to withdraw a plea of 
guilty or no contest is not a ground for setting the 
plea aside, but may be the ground for extending the 
time to make a motion under Section 77-13-6. 
77-13-6. Withdrawn! of plea. 
(1) A plea of not guilty may be withdrawn at any 
time prior to conviction. 
(2) (a) A plea of guilty or no contest may be with-
drawn only upon good cause shown and with 
leave of the court. 
(b) A request to withdraw a plea of guilty or no 
contest is made by motion, and shall be made 
within 30 days after the entry of the plea. 
(3) This section does not restrict the rights of an 
imprisoned person under Rule 65B(i), Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. 1989 
76-2-303. Entrapment. 
(1) It is a defense that the actor was entrapped into 
committing the offense. Entrapment occurs when a 
law enforcement officer or a person directed by or 
acting in co-operation with the officer induces the 
commission of an offense in order to obtain evidence 
of the commission for prosecution by methods creat-
ing a substantial risk that the offense would be com-
mitted by one not otherwise ready to commit it. Con-
duct merely affording a person an opportunity to com-
mit an offense does not constitute entrapment. 
(2) The defense of entrapment shall be unavailable 
when causing or threatening bodily injury is an ele-
ment of the offense charged and the prosecution is 
based on conduct causing or threatening the injury to 
a person other than the person perpetrating the en-
trapment. 
(3) The defense provided by this section is avail-
able even though the actor denies commission of the 
conduct charged to constitute the offense. 
(4) Upon written motion of the defendant, the court 
shall hear evidence on the issue and shall determine 
as a matter of fact and law whether the defendant 
was entrapped to commit the offense. Defendant's mo-
tion shall be made at least ten days before trial ex-
cept the court for good cause shown may permit a 
later filing. 
(6) Should the court determine that the defendant 
was entrapped, it shall dismiss the case with preju-
dice, but if the court determines the defendant was 
not entrapped, such issue may be presented by the 
defendant to the jury at trial. Any order by the court 
dismissing a case based on entrapment shall be ap-
pealable by the state. 
(6) In any hearing before a judge or jury where the 
defense of entrapment is an issue, past offenses of the 
defendant shall not be admitted except that in a trial 
where the defendant testifies he may be asked of his 
past convictions for felonies and any testimony given 
by the defendant at a hearing on entrapment may be 
used to impeach his testimony at trial. 1979 
ADDENDUM #3 
4 WE WOULD LIKE TO HAVE INCLUDED FOR THE COURT'S 
5 CONSIDERATION, THOUGH, A STATEMENT BY MR. JONES. AND THE 
6 THRUST OF THE STATEMENT WOULD BE THIS: MR. JONES DOES NOT 
7 DENY THAT THERE WAS A TRANSFER OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE. 
8 BUT HIS CONCERN FROM THE VERY BEGINNING OF THIS CASE WAS 
9 THE CONDUCT OF THE INFORMANT IN THIS CASE. 
10 MR. JONES WOULD NOT HAVE YOU BELIEVE THAT HE IS 
11 AS HE SAYS, AN ANGLE. HE CERTAINLY HAD A PROBLEM WITH 
12 DRUGS BEFORE HE EVER MET MR. FERNANDEZ, BEFORE HE DID 
13 ANYTHING WITH MR. FERNANDEZ. BUT HE FEELS AS THOUGH MR. 
14 FERNANDEZ PREYED ON HIS DRUG VULNERABILITY AND DID THAT BY 
15 WAY OF COMING TO MR. JONES'S HOUSE PRIOR TO THE TIME OF 
16 TRANSACTIONS, INTRODUCING MR. JONES TO REGULARS OF HEROIN, 
17 AND THEN GOT MR. JONES TO SELL HIM SOME COCAINE OUT OF AN 
18 OBLIGATION BECAUSE THE UNDERCOVER INFORMANT HAD PROVIDED 
19 HIM WITH DRUGS. 
20 MR. JONES HAS BEEN VERY CONCERNED ABOUT THAT, 
21 AND THAT'S THE ISSUE THAT HE ASKED ME TO RAISE IN TERMS OF 
22 THE ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE. HE BELIEVED THAT HE WAS 
23 PARTICULARLY VULNERABLE, AND HE DIDN'T BELIEVE THAT'S 
24 SOMETHING THAT UNDERCOVER AGENTS OUGHT TO BE DOING, TAKING 
25 ADVANTAGE OF VULNERABILITIES OF DRUG ADDICTS. 
CREED H. BARKER, CSR 
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1 HE'S WILLING TO ACKNOWLEDGE IN TERMS OF A 
2 DEFENSE, WE WOULD PROBABLY — WE WOULD NOT BE SUCCESSFUL, 
3 BUT HE WANTS THE COURT TO UNDERSTAND PART OF THE MOTIVATION 
4 BEHIND THIS WAS THE FACT THAT MR. FERNANDEZ HAD BEEN COMING 
5 TO HIS HOUSE GIVING HIM DRUGS, SHOT HIM UP, AND HIS WIFE AS 
6 WELL. 
7 THE DEFENDANT: WHILE I WAS AT WORK. 
8 MS. MOWER: HIS CONCERN IS THAT PROBABLY 
9 SHOULDN'T BE HAPPENING IN THESE KINDS OF CASES. 
